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Nowadays industries are collecting a massive and exponentially growing amount of
data that can be utilized to extract useful insights for improving various aspects of our life.
Data analytics (e.g., via the use of machine learning) has been extensively applied to make
important decisions in various real world applications. However, it is challenging for resource-
limited clients to analyze their data in an efficient way when its scale is large. Additionally,
the data resources are increasingly distributed among different owners. Nonetheless, users’
data may contain private information that needs to be protected.
Cloud computing has become more and more popular in both academia and industry
communities. By pooling infrastructure and servers together, it can offer virtually unlimited
resources easily accessible via the Internet. Various services could be provided by cloud
platforms including machine learning and data analytics.
The goal of this dissertation is to develop privacy-preserving cloud-assisted data ana-
lytics solutions to address the aforementioned challenges, leveraging the powerful and easy-
to-access cloud. In particular, we propose the following systems.
To address the problem of limited computation power at user and the need of privacy
protection in data analytics, we consider geometric programming (GP) in data analytics, and
design a secure, efficient, and verifiable outsourcing protocol for GP. Our protocol consists
of a transform scheme that converts GP to DGP, a transform scheme with computationally
indistinguishability, and an efficient scheme to solve the transformed DGP at the cloud
side with result verification. Evaluation results show that the proposed secure outsourcing
protocol can achieve significant time savings for users.
To address the problem of limited data at individual users, we propose two distributed
learning systems such that users can collaboratively train machine learning models without
losing privacy. The first one is a differentially private framework to train logistic regression
models with distributed data sources. We employ the relevance between input data features
and the model output to significantly improve the learning accuracy. Moreover, we adopt
an evaluation data set at the cloud side to suppress low-quality data sources and propose a
differentially private mechanism to protect user’s data quality privacy. Experimental results
show that the proposed framework can achieve high utility with low quality data, and strong
privacy guarantee.
The second one is an efficient privacy-preserving federated learning system that en-
ables multiple edge users to collaboratively train their models without revealing dataset.
To reduce the communication overhead, we select well-aligned and large-enough magnitude
gradients for uploading which leads to quick convergence. To minimize the noise added and
improve model utility, each user only adds a small amount of noise to his selected gradients,
encrypts the noise gradients before uploading, and the cloud server will only get the aggre-
gate gradients that contain enough noise to achieve differential privacy. Evaluation results
show that the proposed system can achieve high accuracy, low communication overhead, and
strong privacy guarantee.
In future work, we plan to design a privacy-preserving data analytics with fair ex-
change, which ensures the payment fairness. We will also consider designing distributed
learning systems with heterogeneous architectures.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the data collected every day via social media and networks, mobile
phones, and all other channels has been growing exponentially. These data would provide
huge amount of potential useful information and insights. Data analytics has been widely
used to extract insights from massive amount of data via machine learning techniques, such
as deep neutral networks, decision tree, and support vector machine. For example, hospitals
have been analyzing patients’ medical records to provide most cost-effective treatment plan
[1]; financial institutes also perform frequent data analytics process to detect fraudulent
transactions and illegal behaviors [2]; smart grid systems employ various data anayltics
tools to monitor the power transmission process [3]. Mathematical optimization techniques
have been employed frequently to improve performance of fundamental machine learning
algorithms. For example, authors in [4] use convex optimization to improve neural network
model accuracy. However, it is very challenging for individuals and small corporations to
process large-scale data due to limited resources. Moreover, data resources are increasingly
distributed and stored by different owners. How to efficiently analyze distributed data poses
challenges.
Cloud computing has been widely adopted in both academia and industry communi-
ties. With Internet access, it provides unlimited resources through the on-demand business
model, which helps solve computation-extensive tasks for resource-limited users. Also, the
cloud service can be easily reached through computers and mobile phones. That enables a
variety of services to be provided by the cloud, including cloud-facilitated data analytics.
Although cloud computing is promising to help solve large-scale mathematical op-
timization problems in data analytics, outsourcing mathematical optimization problems to
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the cloud may pose security and privacy concerns. The first concern is data privacy for
both input data and model output. There may exist sensitive information in the problem
formulation and model results, thus we need to protect their privacy during outsourcing
process. To protect data against potential leakage, one can encrypt problem formulation
before outsourcing to the cloud. Another concern is the verifiability of results returned from
the cloud server. Since data operations on the cloud side remains unclear to the users, it is
necessary to verify the returned results. For example, the cloud server might not follow our
proposed algorithm to save computing resources. If the cloud sever is under attack during
the computation period or suffers from system failures, it might also return incorrect results.
In other words, the cloud server is considered malicious and the outsourcing algorithm should
be able to check the correctness of the returned results.
In addition, machine learning models for data analytics usually require a vast amount
of data, which may prevent individual users from obtaining high-accuracy learning models
based on their own data. One feasible solution would be that users collaboratively train
the machine learning models under the coordination of a cloud server. However, the users
may own private data and cannot disclose the data to the cloud server or other users. For
example, hospitals and healthcare institutes may be incentivized to collaboratively train
machine learning models for better diagnosis results, but health data is sensitive and should
not be shared with any third party. Moreover, communication overhead in the distributed
learning setting could also be a potential issue for edge/mobile devices that have limited
bandwidth.
1.1 Overview of This Dissertation
The goal of this dissertation is to design privacy-preserving cloud-assisted mathemat-
ical optimization and machine learning systems for data analytics. For this purpose, we
2
propose several cloud-assisted systems.
1.1.1 Privacy-Preserving Cloud-Assisted Mathematical Optimization for Data
Analytics
Mathematical optimization has been widely adopted in data analytics. For exam-
ple, Khosravi et al. [4] proposed to use Geometric Programming (GP) to learn a naive
Bayes distribution for improving the performance of logistic regression classifier with miss-
ing features. Solving mathematical optimization for data analytics is requiring extensive
computation power when the data scale is large. Some recent works [5, 6, 7] have been
proposed to solve large scale mathematical optimization by outsourcing the problem to the
cloud server, and homomorphic encryption techniques were adopted to protect their data
privacy. However, those techniques would usually introduce high computation cost and com-
plex encryption/decryption operations. Moreover, the users cannot verify the correctness of
returned results from the cloud server.
To address these issues, we design an efficient and privacy-preserving system for
outsourcing GP problems to the cloud server [8], which has not been studied before. In
particular, we consider a general GP problem. The GP is first converted to a convex dual
geometric problem (DGP) by variable substitutions and the Lagrange dual method. Next,
the user transforms (i.e., encrypts) the DGP through multiplying the decision variable and
constraints by random sparse matrices. We prove that the transformed DGP is computa-
tionally indistinguishable from the DGP both in value and in structure. Then based on the
dual problem theory and the gradient projection method, the cloud solves the transformed
DGP, and sends the result to the user, who can then efficiently derive the solution to its
original GP and verify the solution. The scheme protects the user’s privacy by letting the
cloud operate on the transformed DGP, rather than any original problem formulations. We
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implement the system with both Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and a laptop to
evaluate performance of the designed outsourcing protocol. Experimental results show that
the proposed secure outsourcing system can achieve significant time savings for users.
1.1.2 Privacy-Preserving Cloud-Assisted Machine Learning for Data Analytics
To benefit from other users’ data in machine learning while protecting data privacy,
we propose two privacy-preserving cloud-assisted systems that each achieves differential pri-
vacy. The first system is Privacy-Preserving Cloud-Assisted Distributed Logistic Regression
that has high learning accuracy and is robust against low quality data of participating users.
To achieve differential privacy during training, noise is usually added to the gradients be-
fore uploading to cloud server. However, model accuracy would be affected by the noisy
gradients at each iteration. Our basic idea is to more wisely add noise by exploring the
relevance connection between model output and input features. That allows us to add less
noise to objective coefficients with high relevance, and vice-versa. This way, the model ac-
curacy could be improved significantly. Specifically, first each user computes the magnitude
of relevance between the learning output and the input data features based on layer-wise
relevance propagation [9]. Then, the local logistic regression learning objective is approxi-
mated with function of polynomial terms. Based on magnitudes of relevance for each data
feature, different carefully-crafted noises are injected to the different coefficients of the poly-
nomial objective function for achieving differential privacy. In addition, some users may hold
low-quality data possibly due to inaccurate data collection processes, which may impact the
effectiveness of the trained model in distributed learning. Thus, we utilize an evaluation
dataset on the cloud side to measure how good each users data quality is when the local pa-
rameters are uploaded to the cloud server and filter out low-quality data. Since low-quality
data are not included in the aggregation process, the learned model performance would not
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be significantly impacted. Moreover, the global parameters are updated in a way that pre-
serves differential privacy, and user’s data quality privacy is also protected. This process
iterates until the training converges.
The second system is Privacy-Preserving Cloud-Assisted Efficient Federated Learning.
Federated Learning uses some form of distributed stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and
requires a cloud server to coordinate the training process. It usually involves many iterations
and incurs high communication cost. To reduce the communication cost, our basic idea is to
select gradients more effectively to achieve faster convergence of training. In particular, each
user trains on his local dataset and select the gradients that are aligned with global model
gradient tendency, as some local updates may not contribute to the model convergence due to
non-IID (independent and identically distributed) data among users. Gradient magnitude is
also considered as another selection criteria as large magnitude usually means more impact
to model training. By excluding those less consistent gradient uploads, the global model
updates would converge much faster as those uploads may contribute nothing to or diverge
the global updates. For privacy protection, we adopt the basic approach of adding noise to
gradients to achieve differential privacy, and try to minimize the noise and improve learning
accuracy by leveraging cryptography techniques. Existing work on this topic either adds
too much noise at each user [10] or relies on the untrusted server to add noise. Different
from them, in our solution, each client will first add a small amount of noise to perturb the
gradients uploading to cloud server. Then, homomorphic encryption is adopted to encrypt
the noisy gradients before uploading to the cloud server. Finally, the cloud server decrypts
the sum of the noisy gradients and updates the global model parameters without learning




The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an ef-
ficient privacy-preserving outsourcing protocol to solve large-scale Geometric Programming.
Chapter 3 introduces a collaborative privacy-preserving logistic regression learning system.
Chapter 4 presents a privacy-preserving efficient federated learning system. Chapter 5 con-
cludes the dissertation and discusses future work.
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2 Privacy-Preserving Outsourcing of Large-Scale Geometric Programming to
the Cloud
2.1 Introduction
Mathematical optimization has found applications in various data analytics areas,
such as computer science [1], signal processing [2], and economics [3]. If the objective func-
tion is geometric and the feasible region is constrained to a system of linear equalities and
inequalities, it is called Geometric Programming (GP), one of the most widely used mathe-
matical optimization. A number of works have been proposed to adopt GP in data mining
tasks. For instance, GP is utilized to learn a naive Bayes distribution that improves the
performance of a given logistic regression classifier and can efficiently output expected pre-
dictions with missing features [4]. The work in [5] employed GP to obtain the optimal power
and resource allocation in blockchain computation tasks. However, solving GP requires
many computing resources when its scale is large. Thus, it is attractive for a client with low
computing capability to outsource large-scale GP problems to the cloud.
Although outsourcing to the cloud allows a client to solve large-scale GP problems,
it also brings some new issues [6, 7]. Privacy is the first issue to be handled. Since both the
outsourced tasks and the results to these tasks may contain sensitive information that the
client does not expect to be exposed to the cloud. To ensure the input privacy (i.e., secrecy
of the original GP problem) is not breached, the client has to encrypt the original problem
before uploading it to the cloud. The output privacy should also be protected, which means
the cloud should not be able to infer the solution to the original GP problem.
Verifiability is the next issue to be considered. The client needs to verify whether the
result returned is correct or not. The cloud may return a random result to save computing
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resources when the outsourced task is highly resource-consuming. Even though the cloud
performs faithfully, some inevitable hardware and software bugs in cloud may also lead to
an incorrect result. Thus without verification, the correctness of the result returned by the
cloud cannot be guaranteed.
Lastly, efficiency is also an issue that needs to be addressed. It requires that the over-
head of the client should be substantially reduced when outsourcing is chosen. Furthermore,
the amount of computation performed by the cloud is comparable to the overload of solving
the original problem.
In this chapter, we develop an efficient and privacy-preserving algorithm for out-
sourcing GP problems [8]. Specifically, we consider a general GP problem. Due to the
characteristics of GP, first the GP is converted to a convex dual geometric problem (DGP)
by variable substitutions and the Lagrange dual method. Next, the client transforms (i.e.,
encrypts) the DGP through multiplying the decision variable and constraints by random
sparse matrices. We show that the transformed DGP is computationally indistinguishable
from the DGP both in value and in structure. Then based on the dual problem theory and
the gradient projection method, the cloud solves the transformed DGP, and sends the result
to the client, who can then efficiently derive the solution to its original GP and verify the
solution. The algorithm protects the client’s privacy by letting the cloud operate on the
transformed DGP, rather than any original problem matrices.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, it is the first privacy-preserving solution for outsourcing
GP problems to the cloud. It consists of a transform scheme that conveys GP to DGP,
a transform scheme that protects the DGP, and a scheme to solve the transformed
DGP at the cloud side.
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• We formally prove that the transformed DGP problem can protect the client’s data
privacy. In particular, the transformed DGP has the property of computationally
indistinguishability.
• We implement the proposed solution on the Amazon EC2 platform and a laptop.
Experimental results show that the proposed secure outsourcing mechanism can achieve
significant time savings for the client.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents problem formu-
lation. Section 2.3 introduces the secure transformation scheme. Section 2.4 describes the
DGP problem. Section 2.5 presents in detail the algorithm for solving the outsourced DGP.
Performance evaluation is presented in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 reviews related work. Section
2.8 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Problem Formulation
2.2.1 Geometric Problem Formulation


















i ≤ 1, k = 1, . . . ,m
x > 0
(2.1)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
t is the optimization variable, and Nk, for k = 0, 1, . . . ,m, and cj,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , Nm represent the number of terms in each function and term coefficients,





Original GP Solution to 
original GP
Transformed GP Solution to 
transformed GP
Figure 2.1: System architecture for outsourcing GP
the objective function and constraint functions can be expressed as the sum of posynomial
terms [9].
GP problems arise frequently in engineering applications. For example, in a power
control problem, each decision variable xi represents the positive transmitting power level,
and the interface power of each transmitter/receiver pair can be expressed as posynomial
terms. This problem can be formulated as a GP problem where decision variables are subject
to practical constraint functions. Another example is semiconductor device operations. In
particular, the objective function is to choose the doping profile to minimize the base transit
time, while the doping profile value is bounded and consists of posynomial terms. Obviously,
this problem can also be formulated as a GP problem.
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2.2.2 System Architecture
As shown in Fig. 2.1, we consider an asymmetric two-party computing architecture,
where a local client is resource limited while a remote cloud server has abundant computing
resources. The client is unable to solve the original GP problem with local computational
resources in an acceptable amount of time. Thus, the client outsources the GP problem
to the cloud after making certain transformations to it (it is called transformed GP after
transformations). Then, the cloud server solves the transformed GP and sends the solution
of the transformed GP back to the client, who will verify and decrypt the solution for the
original GP problem.
2.2.3 Threat Model
We assume a malicious cloud server. In particular, the cloud attempts to learn the
client’s original GP problem from the outsourced problem and the returned results of its
own computations. Additionally, the cloud may not follow the proposed protocol and return
incorrect results.
To securely outsource the computation of the GP problem, we adopt the concept of
computational indistinguishability under a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) [10]. In a matrix,
we notice that the elements’ values and positions both carry private information. In the
following, we formally define computational indistinguishability under a CPA for these two
types of private information, respectively.
We first present the definition of a pseudorandom function as follows, which will be
employed to perform matrix transformations with CPA security.
Definition 1. Let X = {Xn}n∈N be a probability ensemble and Y = {Yn}n∈N be
a truly random function. We say X is a pseudorandom function if for all probabilistic
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polynomial-time distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function µ such that
|Pr[D(Xn) = 1]− Pr[D(Yn) = 1]| ≤ µ (2.2)
This definition can be extended to the case where a distinguisher D has access to
multiple elements of the vectors X and Y, i.e., when comparing two matrices.
Definition 2. Let R ∈ Rm×n be a random matrix with elements in its j th column
sampled from a uniform distribution with interval [−Rj, Rj] ∀j ∈ [1, n]. Matrices R and
G ∈ Rm×n are computationally indistinguishable if for any probabilistic polynomial time
distinguisher D there exists a negligible function β such that
|Pr[D(gij) = 1]− Pr[D(rij) = 1]| ≤ β (2.3)
where i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n], gij is the element in the ith row and j th column of G, and rij is
the element in the ith row and j th column of R. Distinguisher D outputs 1 when it finds
out gij is not chosen from matrix G and 0 otherwise.
2.3 A Privacy-Preserving Transformation Scheme
To securely outsource a GP problem to the cloud, the client must first encrypt
the problem by performing certain computations. In this section, we describe a privacy-
preserving transformation that hides elements of a vector, and elements and structure of a
matrix, which can be employed to encrypt a GP problem.
2.3.1 Privacy-Preserving Vector Addition
The client can efficiently hide a private variable vector by adding a randomly gener-
ated vector to it. Specifically, a private variable vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
t can be encrypted
as follows:
y = x + r (2.4)
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where yi = xi+ri for any i ∈ [1, n], and yi, xi, and ri are the ith element of vector y,x and r,
respectively. We assume that xi is within the range [−K,K], where K = 2l(l > 0) is a posi-
tive constant. Additionally, vector r ∈ Rn×1 is randomly generated with its elements subject





−c ≤ ri ≤ c
0 otherwise
(2.5)
where c = 2l+p(p > 0) is a positive constant, and ri, i ∈ [1, n] is the ith element of vector r.
Next we will obtain the following theorem that vectors r and y are computationally indis-
tinguishable.
Theorem 1. Let r be a random vector with elements sampled from a uniform distribution
with interval [−c, c]. Then vectors r and y = x + r are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. According to Definition 1, we need to prove that any probabilistic polynomial time
distinguisher D cannot distinguish yi from ri for any i ∈ [1, n] except with negligible success
probability, where yi and ri are the ith element of vector y and r respectively. The best
strategy for a polynomial time distinguisher D when presented with a sample yi is to return
b← {0, 1} with equal probability if −c ≤ yi ≤ c, and 1 if yi < −c or yi > c. Therefore, the
success probability of the distinguisher with the input being yi = xi + ri is given by
Pr[D(yi) = 1] =
1
2
Pr[−c ≤ xi + ri ≤ c]




(1− Pr[xi + ri < −c]− Pr[xi + ri > c])
+ Pr[xi + ri < −c] + Pr[xi + ri > c]
(2.6)
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Recall that xi is within the range [−K,K], and ri is sampled from a uniform distribution
specified by (2.5). We have that
Pr[xi + ri > c] = Pr[ri > c− xi]




Similarly, we find that Pr[xi + ri < −c] ≤ K2c . Consequently, we have that the success
probability of the distinguisher D is bounded as follows:







On the other hand, when the input is ri, obviously we can obtain that:




According to Eq. (2), for any i ∈ [1, n], we get that















which is a negligible function for large p. This concludes the proof.
2.3.2 Privacy-Preserving Matrix Multiplication
The client efficiently encrypts the values of its private problem matrix by performing
sparse random matrix multiplications. In particular, a private matrix H ∈ Rm×n can be
efficiently encrypted by performing the following multiplications:
H̃ = DHF (2.12)
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Here D ∈ Rm×m is a diagonal matrix defined as
di,j =

vi i = j for i, j ∈ [1,m]
0 otherwise
(2.13)
where the value vi, for i ∈ [1,m], is generated based on the uniform distribution defined in
(2.5). F ∈ Rn×n is also a diagonal matrix with elements being arbitrary positive constant
M . Consequently, the elements of H̃ in (2.12) are given by
h̃i,j = di,ihi,jfj,j = vihi,jM (2.14)
Assume that the element values of matrix H are within the range [−T, T ]. Next we
can arrive at Theorem 2 that the encrypted private matrix H̃ and a random matrix R with
elements sampled from a uniform distribution are computationally indistinguishable.
Theorem 2. Let R ∈ Rm×n be a random matrix with elements in its j th column sampled
from a uniform distribution with interval [−c, c], for j ∈ [1, n]. Matrices R and H̃ are
computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. According to Definition 2, we need to prove that ri,j and h̃i,j, for i ∈ [1,m], j ∈
[1, n], are computationally indistinguishable for matrices R and H̃ to be computationally
indistinguishable. Specifically, we prove that any polynomial time distinguisher D cannot
distinguish h̃i,j from ri,j, for i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n], except with negligible success probability.
The distinguisher D is defined in the same way as in Theorem 1. Therefore, the
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success probability of the distinguisher D is given by
Pr[D(h̃i,j) = 1] =
1
2
Pr[−c ≤ h̃i,j ≤ c]




(1− Pr[h̃i,j < −c]− Pr[h̃i,j > c])
+ Pr[h̃i,j < −c] + Pr[h̃i,j > c]
(2.15)
where


















the parameter γ is the probability of the element hi,j being positive and 1 − γ is hi,j being
negative. Similarly, we find that Pr[h̃i,j < −c] ≤ 12 −
1
2MT
. Consequently, we have that the
success probability of distinguisher D is bounded as follows:








According to Eq. (2.3), for i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n], it follows that










Thus, β(M) can be guaranteed as a negligible function when MT approaches 1. This
concludes the proof.
2.3.3 Privacy-Preserving Matrix Permutation
Although the matrix transformation in Eq. (2.12) hides the values of the elements in
H, it still reveals the original positions of the non-zero elements, i.e., H’s structure, which is
also private. Next, we design secure permutations that can hide H’s structure by randomly
reordering the rows and columns of H.
The client applies the random permutations as follows:
Ĥ = EH̃U (2.20)
where E ∈ Rm×m and U ∈ Rn×n are random permutation matrices, and their elements are
defined by
ei,j = δπ(i),j ∀i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1,m]
ui,j = δπ(i),j ∀i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, n]
(2.21)
where i and j are the row and column indexes, respectively. The random permutation
function π(·) maps an original index i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} to its permuted index within the same
range. Besides, the Kronecker delta function as defined in [11] is given by
δi,j =

1, i = j
0, i 6= j
(2.22)
The details of generating random permutation matrices in Eq. (2.20) are summarized
in Algorithm 1.
In addition, the client is able to recover the original matrix H̃ by applying the following
inverse permutations:
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Algorithm 1 Random permutation matrix generation
Input: Initial index set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
Output: Random permutation matrix P
1: Set π = In; (identical permutation)
2: for i = n down to 2 do
3: Set j to a random integer with 1 ≤ j ≤ i;
4: Swap π[i] and π[j] in set N ;
5: end for
6: for i = 1 to n do
7: for j = 1 to n do
8: π(i) outputs the ith element in set N ;
9: δπ(i),j outputs value based on Eq. (2.22);




H̃ = ETĤUT (2.23)
To get this result, the orthogonal property of permutation matrices are applied, i.e., ETE = I
and UTU = I, where I is the identity matrix.
2.4 The Lagrange Dual Problem
Since the objective function f0 and constraint functions gk in GP problem (2.1) are
posynomials and are non-convex in general [12], GP problem (2.1) is a non-convex opti-
mization problem and it can take exponential time to solve this problem, especially with
large-scale decision variables and constraints. In this section, we identify an equivalent dual
optimization problem that is convex with only linear constraints, i.e., the dual geometric
problem.
In particular, first we transform the original non-convex GP problem with the follow-
ing variable substitution:
y = log x (2.24)
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where y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn×1,x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn×1.







atjy for j = 1, . . . , Nm (2.25)
where aj = (aj1, . . . , ajn)
t for j = 1, . . . , Nm. Taking a logarithmic transformation of the ob-
jective and constraint functions, the original GP problem (2.1) can be equivalently rewritten
as:
Minimize log[F (y)]
subject to log[Gk(y)] ≤ 0, k = 1, . . . ,m.










τj for k = 1, . . . ,m
(2.27)
According to [13], the problem (2.26) is now a convex programming problem.
In the following, we use the Lagrangian dual approach to solve problem (2.26). Since
the interiority constraint qualification holds, there is no gap between problem (2.26) and its
Lagrangian dual stated below:
LD : Maximize L(y,u)
∇yL(y,u) = 0
u ≥ 0,y unrestricted
(2.28)
20
where the Lagrangian function is












for all k ∈ [N0 + 1, Nm]
(2.30)






δk = ui for i ∈ [1,m]
(2.31)






























From Eq. (2.25), (2.30), and (2.31), the term ui log[Gi(y)] in Eq. (2.29) can also be
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rewritten as:





























































We finally use Eq. (2.31), (2.32), and (2.35) to replace the LD problem (2.28) with
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where A = [a1 a2 . . . ak] ∈ Rn×Nm .
Note that the DGP problem (2.36) is a convex programming problem with linear
constraints. We denote the optimal solution to (2.36) as (δ∗, u∗).
Since the DGP problem (2.36) is convex and the affine constraints are feasible, the
strong duality holds [13] and according to Eq. (2.24), (2.25), and (2.30), we have that




where c = (c1, c2, . . . , cNm)
t. That is, we can use the result of the DGP problem (2.36) to
recover the result of the original GP problem (2.1).
2.5 Solving the Outsourced Problem
In this section, we describe a secure and efficient algorithm to solve the large-scale
GP problems based on the DGP problem derived in Section 2.4.
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2.5.1 An Iterative Solution
Before we delve into details about the proposed algorithm, we first present the gradi-
ent projection method (GPM), an iterative solution method for nonlinear convex optimiza-
tion problems that we employ to solve the DGP problem in (2.36).
For optimization problems, the search direction of fastest descent is the negative
gradient of the objective function. However, moving along the negative gradient may lead
to violating the constraint functions. The main idea of the GPM is to project the nega-
tive gradient in such a way that improves the objective function while not violating any
constraints.
In particular, let’s first consider the following convex optimization problem
Minimize f(z)
subject to A′z = b′
z ≥ 0
(2.38)
Given a feasible point z, the moving direction of steep descent is −∇f(z). However, moving
along −∇f(z) may violate feasibility of the solutions. To this end, the moving direction d is
projected so that d = −P∇f(z), where P is a suitable projection matrix [13]. The following
Theorem 3 [13, 14] will provide a way to find an improving feasible direction d.
Theorem 3. Consider the optimization problem in (2.38), and suppose f(z) is differentiable
at the point z. Let projection matrix P be of the form P = I−A′T(A′A′T)−1A. Then
d = −P∇f(z) is an improving feasible direction if d 6= 0, and z is a KKT point if d = 0.
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Thus d is a feasible direction. In addition, according to the properties of projection matrix
, i.e., P = PT, P = P2 [13], we have
∇f(z)Td = −∇f(z)TP∇f(z)
= −∇f(z)TPTP∇f(z)
= −||P∇f(z)||2 < 0
(2.40)
Thus d is also an improving direction if d 6= 0. From Eq. (3.8), (3.9), we have d is an
improving feasible direction, which completes the proof.
Once an improving feasible direction d is found, the optimal point of the objective
function f(z) can be approached in the following iterative way:
zk+1 = zk + λkdk (2.41)







: dik < 0
}
dk 6≥ 0
∞ dk ≥ 0
(2.42)
where zik and dik are the ith elements of zk and dk, respectively. Hence, the value of λk is
determined by the following line search problem:
Minimize f(zk + λdk)
subject to 0 ≤ λ ≤ λmax
(2.43)
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Next, since problem (2.38) consists of a convex objective function with only linear
constraints, the GPM converges. The proof for convergence of the GPM is omitted here due
to the space limitation.
2.5.2 A Secure Algorithm For Solving Large-scale GP
As shown in Section 2.4, the client transforms the original GP problem (2.1) to the
DGP problem (2.36), and the DGP problem is outsourced to the cloud server for solving. To
protect the client’s data privacy, we conduct some transformations based on the proposed
scheme in Section 2.3.
For convenience, we first rewrite the DGP problem in (2.36) as the following form:
Minimize D(z)
















b = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)t ∈ R(n+m+1)×1
z = (δ,u)t ∈ R(Nm+m)×1
Thus, to protect the sensitive information of the coefficient matrix, the client applies
the matrix transformations (2.12) and (2.20) to W in (2.44) as follows:
W̄ = VWT (2.45)
where V is formed by a random permutation matrix and a random diagonal matrix, i.e.,
V = ED, and T formed by a diagonal matrix of arbitrary positive constant and a random
permutation matrix, i.e., T = FU.
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Furthermore, to protect the privacy of decision variable vector z, the vector transfor-
mation (2.4) is applied in the following:
z̄ = T−1(z + r) (2.46)
where r ∈ R(Nm+m)×1 is a random vector. Based on Eq. (2.45) and (2.46) we have
b̄ = W̄z̄ = V(b + Wr) (2.47)
Now we can transform the problem (2.44) into the following privacy-preserving prob-
lem:
Minimize D(z̄)
subject to W̄z̄ = b̄
z̄ ≥ T−1r
(2.48)
Next, the encrypted problem (2.48) will be sent to the cloud server, and the GPM
will be applied to solve it. The complete procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Secure algorithm for solving outsourced large-scale GP
Input: Starting point z0 that W̄z̄0 = b̄
Output: Optimal point z̄∗ for problem (2.48)
1: Initialize k = 0;
2: Compute P and d0 from Theorem 3;
3: Let d = d0;
4: while d 6= 0 do
5: Compute λmax using Eq. (2.42);
6: Solve the line search for λk:
λk = argmin(0 ≤ x ≤ λmax){ f(zk + λdk)};
7: Let z̄k+1 = z̄k + λkdk;
8: k = k + 1;
9: Compute dk from Theorem 3;
10: Let d = dk;
11: end while
12: Let z̄∗ = z̄k, and z̄
∗ is a KKT point;
13: return z̄∗;
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As stated in Algorithm 2, the cloud server continues the iteration until the secure
outsourcing algorithm converges to the KKT point z̄∗. Once the cloud server determines
that the algorithm has converged, it sends z̄∗ back to the client, who verifies the correctness
of the returned result based on KKT conditions. If the returned result satisfies the KKT
conditions, the client determines the returned result is correct and compute the solution to
the DGP problem (2.36) as follows:
z∗ = Tz̄∗ − r (2.49)
From (2.44), we have z∗ = (δ∗,u∗)t. Thus the solution to the original GP problem (2.1) can
be obtained by following Eq. (2.37).
2.6 Performance Evaluation
This section presents the computational complexity of the proposed solution and
experiment results.
2.6.1 Computational Complexity
The computational cost at each step is analyzed as follows. First, the client transforms
the original GP problem to the DGP problem, which takes O(m2) computational cost. Then,
the client employs the privacy-preserving matrix transformation to encrypt the coefficient
matrices, which induces a computational complexity of O(2m2 + 4mn). Next, the cloud
server solves the outsourced problem, which needs computation of O(2m2n + m3). Lastly,
the client recovers the optimal solution based on the returned solution from the cloud server,
resulting in a computational complexity of O(2mn).
To summarize, the proposed privacy-preserving outsourcing protocol requires compu-
tational complexity of O(max{mn,m2}) at the client side and that of O(max{m2n,m3}) at
the cloud side.
28
Table 2.1: Computing Time (12 cloud nodes, 16GB memory per node)





1,000 21.6s 0.31s 6.7s
2,000 43.9s 0.39s 13.1s
3,000 77.6s 0.52s 29.2s
4,000 137.7s 0.65s 48.1s
5,000 254.9s 0.86s 79.6s
6,000 355.7s 1.03s 98.4s
7,000 536.1s 1.34s 142.7s
8,000 1352.7s 2.17s 301.8s
2.6.2 Experiment Results
In the following, we evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving
outsourcing protocol for GP through experiments. We implemented the proposed protocol
in a real-world scenario. The client side was implemented on a laptop with a dual-core 2.3
GHz CPU, 8GB RAM, and 256 GB solid state drive. The cloud side was implemented on
the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) with a number of computing nodes each of 16GB
memory. Both the client-side and the cloud-side computations were implemented by Matlab
R2018a. The GP problems used in evaluations are randomly generated. Each data point
presented below is the average of 20 runs with different randomness seeds.
We first measure the computing time of the proposed protocol at both the client
and the cloud side. In these experiments, we only used 12 cloud nodes. Table 2.1 shows
the results. It can be observed that the client can complete the needed computations very
quickly, even for large-size GPs. For example, it only takes the client 2.2s to complete the
computation for GP problem size 8000 (i.e., parameter m). The computing time of the cloud
server to obtain the optimal solution is much longer than the client due to the complex nature
of solving the problem. Not surprisingly, the computation time at both the client side and
the cloud side increases when the problem size increases.
Subsequently, we examine the computing saved for the client by our outsourcing
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protocol. As shown in Table 2.1, we compare the computing time of the client when it solves
GP by itself with that when it outsources GP to the cloud. The saved computing increases
dramatically as the problem size increases. For example, the saving can reach 624-fold for
problem size 8000, indicating a 99.8% reduction in computing at the client. This validates
the efficacy of our proposed protocol for the client.
The overall delay for solving GP is also much shorter when outsourcing it to the
more powerful cloud. When the client solves GP by itself, the delay is the time shown in
the second column of Table 2.1. When the client outsources GP to the cloud using our
protocol, the overall delay is the client’s computing time (the 3rd column of Table 2.1) plus
the cloud’s computing time (the 4th column of Table 2.1). Here when delay is concerned the
communication time between the client and the cloud is neglected since it is much shorter
than the computing time. Then from Table 2.1, it can be seen that the overall problem
resolving delay is several times shorter in our solution.
Next, we investigate the computing time at the cloud server when a varying number
of nodes are used. The results are shown in Fig. 2.2. It can be observed that the computing
time of the cloud server decreases as the number of nodes used grows. For example, the
computing time is as low as 302s when 12 nodes are used compared with about 520s when
only 4 nodes are used. The computing time of the cloud server can be further shortened by
using more cloud nodes.
Lastly, we measure the computing time of the cloud server with different node memory
sizes. As it can be seen from Fig. 2.3, the computing time at the cloud server decreases as
the node memory increases. For example, when node memory size increases from 8GB to
32GB, the computing time decreases from 372s to 287s for problem size 8000, indicating a
huge time saving at the cloud side. We also noticed that when the memory size increases
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Figure 2.3: Computing time of cloud server with different node memory sizes
reduction when the memory size increases from 8GB to 16GB. That is because 16GB node
memory is already good for the maximum problem size experimented, i.e., 8000. When the
problem size is larger, the reduction in computing time when node memory increases from
16GB to 32GB should be more.
2.7 Related Work
In recent years, researchers have developed many protocols for privacy-preserving
cloud computing.
Based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [15], Gennaro et al. [16] proposed
a privacy-preserving outsourcing algorithm by employing fully homomorphic encryption
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(FHE). Wang et al. [17] developed an iterative algorithm to solve linear systems of equa-
tions, where a client transforms and encrypts the coefficient matrix using homomorphic
encryption, and the cloud carries out computations on ciphertexts. Hu et al. [18] designed
secure interactive protocols to distribute the feature extraction computations to two inde-
pendent cloud servers. However, these algorithms require the client to perform extensive
data pre-processing and encryption/decryption operations.
Without resorting to homomorphic encryption, Wang et al. [19] presented an efficient
algorithm to securely compute histogram of oriented gradients based on matrix transforma-
tions. Du et al. [20] designed a secure outsourcing protocol for the non-linear programming
problem by applying the reduced gradient method. Shen et al. [21] developed a secure out-
sourcing scheme to solve linear algebraic equations. Some secure outsourcing protocols for
matrix computation have also been developed, such as matrix inversion [22], matrix multi-
plication [23], and matrix determinant [24]. Besides, Zhang et al. [25] considered employing
matrix digest techniques to securely outsource batch matrix multiplication. However, the
privacy-preserving outsourcing algorithm for large-scale GPs has not been studied so far.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated privacy-preserving outsourcing of large-scale geomet-
ric programming problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to solve
geometric programming in cloud computing with privacy protection. We employed a trans-
formation scheme to protect the client’s private data, and formally proved its effectiveness.
The gradient projection method was used by the cloud server to solve the transformed geo-
metric programming problem. Experimental results based on Amazon EC2 showed that the
proposed protocol can provide significant time savings to the client.
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3 Privacy-Preserving Cloud-Assisted Distributed Logistic Regression
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, more and more data are generated in various domains. Industries and
academia have been developing tools and techniques to transform data into useful knowledge
aimed to improve various aspects of our life [1]. With the recent advance in computation
power, machine learning algorithms have been widely adopted to analyze massive data and
make accurate predictions due to their excellent performance in modeling complex patterns
within data. Data sources, such as browsing histories in social media, smart wearables, and
medical data, are usually distributed and could be used together to help improve machine
learning algorithms.
While machine learning techniques are promising and gaining increasing popularity,
there may exist private information in the training data used by the machine learning al-
gorithms, and thus need to be protected. In the past decades, various privacy-preserving
algorithms have been proposed. Motlagh et al [2] presented an association rule (AR) tech-
nique to protect user data. In terms of collaborative learning, secure multi-party computation
(SMC) is proposed to protect intermediate results during training among distributed data
owners. SMC has been used in various machine learning tasks, such as learning decision
trees [3], linear regression functions [4], Naive Bayes classifiers [5], and k-means clustering
[6]. However, those techniques are usually computation-extensive, making it impractical for
large-scale applications.
Differential privacy [7] has also been widely adopted to protect user privacy. Theo-
retically, it could provide formal privacy guarantees no matter what extra information the
attackers have. A lot of work have adopted differential privacy to protect user privacy in
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the training process. A typical approach is first generating noise via Laplace mechanism or
exponential mechanism and then building a noisy model for their dataset using these gener-
ated noises [8]. Some other approaches modify the objective function of the training model
[9]. These mechanisms can perturb the objective function by adding noise to coefficients,
and output predictions of the noisy model.
In fact, there exist various applications of logistic regression in academia and indus-
try. However, only a few work have been proposed to utilize differential privacy in logistic
regression algorithm. The main challenge would be that regression involves solving an opti-
mization problem. It is usually difficult to analyze the relationship between the optimization
results and the original data. Thus, it is hard to determine on the minimum amount of noise
necessary to make the optimization results differentially private. In addition, some users
may hold low-quality data possibly due to inaccurate data collection processes, which may
impact the effectiveness of the trained model in distributed learning. The protection of pri-
vacy usually hides any accurate information of a user’s data, making it difficult to check the
data quality.
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-preserving distributed logistic regression frame-
work that has high learning accuracy and is robust against low quality data of participating
clients. In particular, first each client computes the magnitude of relevance [10] between
the learning output and the input data features. Then, the local logistic regression learn-
ing objective is approximated with function of polynomial terms. Based on magnitudes of
relevance for each data feature, different carefully-crafted noises are injected to the different
coefficients of the polynomial objective function for achieving differential privacy; i.e. more
noise is injected to the coefficients with less relevant features and vice-versa. Then, all the
local parameters will be uploaded to a cloud server, which uses an evaluation dataset [11] to
measure how good each client’s data quality is. The cloud server selectively aggregates the
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local parameters of a subset of clients based on their data quality and updates the global pa-
rameters in a way that preserves differential privacy. This process iterates until the training
converges.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• We propose a differentially private distributed logistic regression framework, which
employs the relevance between input data features and the model output [10] to wisely
add noise to the objective function and maintain good learning accuracy.
• Extensive experimental results show that the proposed framework can achieve low mis-
classification rate, robustness against low quality data, and strong privacy guarantee.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the preliminaries of logistic
regression, differential privacy, and layer-wise relevance propagation. Section 3.3 presents
our privacy-preserving algorithm for distributed logistic regression. Section 3.4 presents
performance evaluation results. Section 3.5 discusses related work. Section 3.6 concludes
the chapter.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide a background introduction to logistic regression, differential
privacy, and Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP).
3.2.1 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a widely adopted machine learning algorithm and applied in dif-
ferent domains to solve regression and classification tasks. Given a database D with n feature
and label tuples, i.e. {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn)}, and xi = (xi1, xi2, · · · , xid) where d is
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where xij > 0, yi ∈ {0, 1}.






[−yi log(hθ(xi))− (1− yi) log(1− hθ(xi))] (3.1)










Here we are training the logistic regression model to find the optimal weights θ? that
minimizes the loss function f(θ):
θ? = arg min
θ
f(θ) (3.3)
When the training process terminates, given a new data point x = (x1, x2, · · · , xd),
the model is able to predict the binary value of the output as follows:
y =

1 if h?θ(x) ≥ τ
0 if h?θ(x) < τ
(3.4)
Typically, threshold τ is set as 0.5.
3.2.2 Differential privacy
Definition 1: Given two databases D and D′ differing at most one data tuple, let S
be a randomized algorithm, and O be the set which contains any possible output of S. S
achieves ε-differential privacy, if and only if the following holds:
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Pr[S(D) = O] ≤ eεPr[S(D′) = O] (3.5)
where ε is the privacy budget that is used to control the strength of the privacy guarantee.
The privacy preservation of S is strong when the value of ε is small.
Laplace mechanism [8] is widely adopted as an efficient way to preserve ε-differential
privacy. In particular, the Laplace mechanism utilizes the global sensitivity ∆, which mea-
sures the largest difference in query results within D and D′. ε-differential privacy is guar-
anteed by injecting noise η into output of f(θ) as follows:
S(D) = f(D) + η,where η ∼ Lap(∆/ε) (3.6)
Since the Laplacian mechanism only works for numerical cases, Mcsherry et al. [12]
proposed the Exponential mechanism for achieving ε-differential privacy in selection process,
which is defined as follows:
Definition 2: Let u be a utility function, and ∆u be the sensitivity of the utility
function. Given a mechanism M and dataset D, we have




where R denotes all the possible outcomes.
There are also two properties associated with differential privacy.
Property 1 (Sequential Composition): Let M1,M2, · · · ,Mn be a set of mechanism
and each satisfies εi−differential privacy, where i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Then the mechanism that
sequentially performs M1,M2, · · · ,Mn will achieve
∑
i εi−differential privacy.
Property 2 (Parallel Composition): Assume each Mi achieves εi−differential privacy,
where i ∈ {1, ..., n}. A mechanism that performs each Mi over disjoint dataset Di would
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satisfy max(εi)−differential privacy.
3.2.3 Layer-wise Relevance Propagation
To measure how related model output is to input features, we adopt Layer-wise
Relevance Propagation (LRP) [10, 13] scheme. Specifically, LRP maps the relevances for
each layer in a backward sequence for a multi-layer framework. The relevance of nodes in
layer l will be calculated from relevance of connected nodes in layer l+ 1. Let Rli denote the
relevance value of node i in layer l, pli be the activation value of node i in layer l, and wij be









i aij + bl
Rl+1j
(3.8)
where bl is the bias of layer l.
However, when the denominator
∑
i aij + bl is too small, the value of R
l
i could be
unbounded during the backward propagation process. An efficient way to address this issue


















aij + bl < 0
(3.9)
where α ≥ 0.
Hence, the relevance of nodes at each layer could be obtained by applying Eq. 3.8
and 3.9 in the backward propagation process. The relevance between model output f(θ)
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Figure 3.1: Distributed logistic regression with low quality data




i . Finally, we would compute the
average relevance Rj(D) for input features xij and perform linear normalization to range











3.3 Privacy-Preserving Distributed Logistic Regression
In this section, we introduce the privacy-preserving algorithm for distributed logistic
regression with relevance and data quality awareness.
3.3.1 System Architecture
As we can see in Fig. 3.1, there are two types of entity in the system: client and cloud
server. Specifically, each client holds a private dataset, and tries to collaboratively train a
logistic regression model with other clients. The cloud server coordinates the collaborative
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training process at each iteration. Since each client is not willing to share his dataset due to
privacy or business concerns, this system allows clients to only share their updated gradients
and the cloud server coordinates and averages global parameters accordingly. Besides, there
exists an evaluation dataset on the cloud side in case some clients hold low quality data,
which might affect the model’s performance. The purpose of the evaluation set is to measure
the utility score (i.e. accuracy) of the model parameters from each client. Then the cloud
server chooses to accept model parameters from a subset of clients with differential privacy
guarantee.
We consider the following threat models. Firstly, we assume that the cloud server is
honest-but-curious. That is, the cloud server follows the algorithm but tries to infer clients’
data records during the training process. Additionally, the clients are also assumed to be
honest-but-curious, which means they correctly compute model parameters and upload to
the cloud server but try to learn other clients’ data records. Clients may also want to learn
about the data quality of other clients. Since other clients’ data quality information is not a
necessity to know, we also aim to protect clients’ data quality information from each other.
Note that since clients’ data quality information is very important for the server to purge
low quality data and improve learning accuracy, we do not aim to protect such information
from the cloud server. That is, clients’ data records are protected against the server but
their data quality information is not protected as a type of trade-off between privacy and
utility. Multiple clients may collude to learn the private information of other clients.
Since directly sharing parameters with the cloud server would breach data privacy,
each client adds Laplacian noise to the polynomial form of the objective function based
on the relevance magnitude of different input data features. Then, the noisy gradients are
uploaded to the cloud server. Next, on the cloud side, an evaluation set is employed to assess
the data quality of clients by testing on their uploaded gradients. A utility score is generated
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after assessment. Simply choosing gradients from those clients with high utility scores may
also leak data quality privacy. For example, some clients may infer the data quality of other
clients if only high data quality clients are selected during the training process. Hence, we
adopt the exponential mechanism to protect the privacy of clients’ data quality while filtering
out low quality data with high probability. In the following, we will discuss the details of
proposed privacy-preserving mechanisms.
3.3.2 Differentially Private Relevance
Recall that for multi-layer structure, we can compute the relevance between the input
data features and the model output by applying LRP. Based on weights matrix multiplica-
tion, sigmoid activation function and unit step function workflow, a logistic regression model
can be structured to a multi-layer framework in the following way, and thus LRP can be
adopted to compute the relevance between the model output and input features.
In particular, for input layer l0 of logistic regression model, each dimension j of input








xijθj + b0 ≥ 0
xijθj∑d




xijθj + b0 < 0
(3.11)
where α is a predefined stabilizer and α ≥ 0. b0 is the bias term. RLs(xi) is the relevance








For output layer L of logistic regression model, relevance of the final output layer L






0 if h?θ < τ
(3.13)
By substituting Eq. 3.12 to Eq. 3.8 and using Eq. 3.11 at the input layer and Eq.
3.13 at the output layer, the whole relevance between the input feature xij and the model
output would be computed. Hence, we have derived the relevance between the input features
and model output for logistic regression.
Since the original input data features are used to compute the relevance value in the
LRP scheme, the relevance value might also reveal clients’ input data and thus needs to be
protected. Hence, we adopt the Laplace mechanism to protect the privacy of original rele-
vance values. In particular, Laplace noise is injected into the Rj(D) to obtain the perturbed










where ε1 is the privacy budget, and ∆ is the global sensitivity of relevance. According to Eq.
3.10, Rl0xij is linearly normalized to range (0, 1), and the number of input features is limited
as d, so the largest difference between the relevances of two neighboring dataset is 2d, and
the average relevance difference of dataset D is 2d/|D|. Therefore, ∆ is set to be 2d/|D|,
and the perturbed relevance Rj achieves ε1−differential privacy.
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3.3.3 Relevance-aware Objective Function Perturbation
In this section, we will perturb the loss objective function of the logistic regression
model. Recall that the loss function of logistic regression is f(x,w) = log(1 + exp(xTi w))−
yix
T




















According to Eq. 3.15, there exists the infinite summation term and no closed form
solution for f
(k)
i (0). To address these two issues, the infinite summation is truncated and
only reserve the first three orders, i.e. k = 0, 1, 2. So, we have f
(0)
1 = log 2, f
(1)
1 = 1/2, f
(2)
1 =




xi∈D γxiφ(w), where γxi is
the coefficient. Based on functional mechanism [9], the global sensitivity ∆L can be set as
2 maxi
∑n
i=1 |γxi |. Thus, we have:




















≤ 2(d/2 + d2/8 + d) = d2/4 + 3d
Next, since some input features are more relevant to the model output and some are
less relevant, we introduce more noise to coefficients of the polynomial objective function
terms that have less relevant features and less noise to those with more relevant features.
According to the privacy-preserving relevance definition in Eq. 3.14, we can divide up the














Here αj can be treated as the corresponding contribution of the j th input feature to the
model output.
LEMMA 1. Given ∆L = d
2/4 + 3d, the relevance-aware objective function pertur-
bation achieves ε2−differential privacy.
Proof 1. Let two datasets D and D′ be neighboring datasets. Without loss of generality,
assume D and D′ differ in the last tuple xn(x
′
n). Since the perturbation of the relevance



































































This concludes the proof.
47
3.3.4 Privacy-Preserving Selection
In the system, some clients may hold low-quality data, which is quite possible in
reality. Take medical data records for an example. Small hospitals may not have advanced
equipment to gather as accurate data as large hospitals. To reduce the possible impact of
low-quality data on learning accuracy, we propose a data quality-aware selection mechanism
on the cloud side to purge the effect of low-quality data. To ensure that clients cannot infer
other clients’ data quality information, the selection processes provides differential privacy
guarantee.
In particular, an evaluation dataset is utilized by the cloud server to assess each
client’s data quality. Each client’s uploaded gradients are evaluated with the dataset and a
utility score is generated. For simplicity, we use the publicly available benchmark dataset
MNIST [15] as the evaluation dataset (in deployment, other datasets could be used dependent
on the application scenarios) and classification accuracy is used as the utility score. If the
server directly chooses the clients whose model gradients have high utility scores, that could
potentially leak some clients’ data quality information to other clients via the aggregate
model parameters. To address this, we adopt the exponential mechanism to add uncertainty
to this selection process. Specifically, the server samples M clients without replacement such
that
Pr(choose client i) ∝ exp( ε3ui
2M∆u
) (3.18)
where ui is the utility score of client i, and ∆u is the global sensitivity.
LEMMA 2. Given a dataset D, the global sensitivity ∆u for classification tasks
would be 1/2.
Proof 2. Let x and y be number of correct predictions and total number of records, respec-
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Thus, we set ∆u = 1/2, and this concludes the proof.
LEMMA 3. The selection process on the cloud side satisfies ε3−differential privacy.
Proof 3. According to Definition 2, selecting each client i satisfies ε3
M
−differential privacy.
The whole selection process samples M clients which would achieve ε3−differential privacy.
The whole privacy-preserving logistic regression scheme is summarized in Algorithm
3. On the client side, differentially private relevance and objective function perturbation
achieve (ε1 + ε2)−differential privacy for data records. On the cloud side, privacy-preserving
selection satisfies ε3−differential privacy for data quality information.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our differentially private logistic
regression algorithm with relevance and data quality awareness, which is abbreviated as
DPLRRQ. We use two well-known benchmark datasets: Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS)[16] and Default of Credit Card Clients [17]. There are 600,000 census records
in the IPUMS dataset, the attributes of which include Sex, Age, Race, Family Size, Number
of Children, Ownership of Dwelling, Living Difficulty, Education, Hours Work per Week,
Filed of Degree, Number of Children, Number of Rooms, Private Health Insurance, Marital
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Algorithm 3 Privacy-preserving distributed logistic regression algorithm
Input: Database D1, D2, · · · , DN , loss function L(θ), privacy budget ε1, ε2, ε3, sampling size
M , the number of batches T , the number of clients N , random seed S
Output: θT
1: The cloud server initializes all the global parameters with random seed S
2: Each client downloads the current global parameters




xi∈D Rxij(xi) for j in [1, d] according to the LRP
Algorithm (3.10)
4: Set ∆ = 2d/|D| based on Section 3.3.2
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11: Set ∆L = d
2/4 + 3d based on Lemma 1
12: for j = 1 to d do
13: γj =
∑





15: for t ∈ [T ] do
16: for i = 1 to N do
17: Each client i computes θti = arg min f i(w)
18: The cloud server collects all the model parameters θti and choose to accept M clients
by applying (3.18)






Status, and Income Class. The logistic regression task based on this dataset is to classify
whether the person belongs to the high-income class or not. For the Default of Credit Card
Clients dataset, it contains 30,000 records and 24 attributes, including credit card owner
attributes (e.g., gender), history of past payment, amount of bill statement attributes, and
amount of previous payment attributes. The classification goal of Credit Card dataset is to
predict whether a credit user will default or not.
For categorical features in the two datasets, we use the one-hot encoding [18] to
transform these attributes to numerical values. All the other feature values are normalized
to range [0, 1]. We randomly sample 20% of the records as the testing set, 10% of the
records as the evaluation set, and the remaining records as the training dataset. Then
training dataset is randomly split into 5 partitions and each client holds one partition. N is
the total number of clients. The clients hold the partitions evenly, such that each partition
is held by N/5 clients. We use the misclassification rate as the performance metric, which is
defined as the ratio of falsely classified records to total records.
To simulate the low-quality data held by some clients, we randomly choose 1/3 of
clients and replace a random fraction (denoted by β) of their dataset with random noise
drawn from range [0, 1]. For simplicity, in the following, we set ε1 = ε2 =
1
2
ε3, and use ε to
denote ε3.
3.4.1 Compared Models
We compare our proposed scheme with other benchmark schemes. The first one
is the Central framework, where all the data are collected and trained in a centralized
manner without protecting privacy. The second one is ADMM [19], where each client adds
differentially private noise to the uploaded parameters in each iteration. The last one is the
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Figure 3.2: Training convergence for the IPUMS dataset with different number of clients
each client learns based on its own data without considering privacy. All the frameworks are
implemented on Pytorch [20].
3.4.2 Training Convergence
In this experiment, we measure the training convergence with different frameworks.
The number of clients ranges from 5 to 15. We set β = 0, ε = 1 and M = 0.6N . As illustrated
in Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3, our proposed DPLRRQ outperforms ADMM and Standalone, which
is especially clear over the Credit Card dataset. DPLRRQ outperforms ADMM because it
considers the relevance between input features and the model output which reduces the noise
added to the model and it also considers the data quality of clients which mitigates the impact
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Figure 3.3: Training convergence for the Credit Card dataset with different number of
clients
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rate due to the limited training data that each client has. The Central scheme has the
best performance since it has all the data and it does not add noise for differential privacy.
When the number of clients increases, however, the performance of our DPLRRQ scheme
gets closer to that of the the Central scheme. This is mainly because more data is available
for training at each iteration when there are more clients.
3.4.3 Data Quality
In this part, we evaluate the data quality awareness of the proposed scheme. To
better demonstrate the effectiveness of using an evaluation dataset at the cloud server in our
scheme, we add No Evaluation into comparison, which is the same as DPLRRQ except that it
does not have the privacy-preserving selection based on the evaluation dataset (see Section
3.3.4). Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5 show the misclassification rates of different schemes when
the fraction of low-quality data β = 20%, 40%, 60%. Generally, the misclassification rate
increases as the amount of low-quality data increases. It is worth noting that there is minimal
degradation of performance in our scheme, while all the other frameworks are significantly
impacted. For example, at a high low-quality data level β = 60% in the IPUMS dataset,
the misclassification rate for DPLRRQ is 23%, while for Central, Standalone, ADMM and
No Evaluation, the misclassification rate reaches 38%, 45%, 44% and 44% respectively. This
shows the effectiveness of our scheme in considering data quality.
3.4.4 Accuracy vs. Privacy Budget
In this experiment, the classification accuracy of different schemes under various pri-
vacy budgets are evaluated. To show the effectiveness of considering the relevance between
input features and the output model in our proposed scheme DPLRRQ, we added No Rel-






























Figure 3.4: Misclassification rate of different frameworks with varying noise proportion































Figure 3.5: Misclassification rate of different frameworks with varying noise proportion
(Credit Card, N = 15)
considered and the same scale of noise is added to all the coefficients of the objective func-
tion. As shown in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7, the misclassification rate of DPLRRQ, ADMM and
No Relevance decreases as the privacy budget increases. DPLRRQ outperforms ADMM and
No Relevance due to the consideration of relevance. Central and Standalone are not affected
by privacy budgets since they do not provide differential privacy. Our DPLRRQ scheme
reaches comparable misclassification rate with Central when ε = 1 or higher, which means
our scheme can achieve high accuracy while maintaining privacy. In addition, our scheme
outperforms Standalone when ε ≥ 0.1.
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Figure 3.7: Misclassification rate under different privacy budgets (Credit Card, N = 15)
privacy guarantee.
3.5 Related Work
There is a line of work on privacy-preserving logistic regression. Zhang et al. [21]
protected the training data via homomorphic encryption. Bost et al. [22] investigated several
classifiers in the setting of two-party computation, in which the server holds the secret model
and the client holds the sensitive data. Both interact in a way with many rounds so that
at the end the client learns the classifier with high accuracy. Recently, Jayaraman et al.
[23] proposed to improve the noise bounds of logistic learning by adding noise directly to
the aggregated model parameters in the multiparty computation setting. Duverle et al. [24]
also proposed a secure two-party learning algorithm to train the logistic regression classifier
without revealing private training sets from each client. Xie et al. [25] showed a secure
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framework to train a logistic regression model in a distributed manner. Their method is
based on Yao’s garbled circuit and an additive homomorphic encryption scheme. Kim et
al. [26, 27] demonstrated secure outsourcing methods to train a logistic regression model on
encrypted data and showed their feasibility with real datasets. However, these encryption-
based schemes generally incur high computation and communication costs.
Zhang et al. [9] demonstrated the Functional mechanism (FM) that protects user data
by perturbing the coefficients of the objective function and finds the optimal parameters by
minimizing the perturbed objective function. However, the noise injected to coefficients are
the same, which may have negative impact on model accuracy. Ligett et al. [28] proposed a
general noise reduction framework for regularized linear regression based on the covariance
perturbation and output perturbation. In particular, the noise reduction mechanism is
adopted to generate a variety of private hypothesis by gradually relaxing the value of ε and
the privacy hypothesis can be computed by optimizing the perturbed objective function.
Recently, Du et al. [29] designed a privacy-preserving logistic regression training framework
by adding carefully-crafted noise to objective function. In addition, other works adopting
different types of noise scaling to achieve differential privacy over distributed data have
also been reported [30, 31, 32, 33]. However, the existing work has not addressed privacy-
preserving distributed logistic regression considering the relevance between input features
and the output model and the data quality of clients.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated privacy-preserving distributed logistic regression. We
developed differentially private layer-wise relevance propagation and loss function pertur-
bation for logistic regression models, which can achieve high accuracy due to consideration
of the relevance between input data features and the output model. When generating the
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aggregate model, the cloud server takes clients’ data quality into account through an evalu-
ation dataset while protecting clients’ data quality privacy via the exponential mechanism.
Experimental results showed that the proposed differentially private learning scheme can
achieve low misclassification rate and strong robustness against low-quality data.
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4 Privacy-Preserving Cloud-Assisted Efficient Federated Learning
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, more and more data are generated by individuals in various domains.
Industries and academia have been developing tools and techniques to transform data into
useful insights aimed to improve various aspects of our life [1]. Machine learning techniques
have gained increasing popularity over years to extract knowledge from data. For example,
massive data from social media websites and apps have been collected every year, such
as browse histories in Twitter, which facilitates analysis and sending customized contents
to targeted customers. Machine learning algorithms also have massive applications in the
medical field. For example, hospitals have been adopting advanced computer vision devices
to detect cancer based on the images. This could provide high detection accuracy and easy
to scale.
Traditionally, a typical machine learning algorithm is to learn and make predictions
based on a single dataset [2]. However, a number of data resources are increasingly dis-
tributed and owned by different organizations. For example, financial data can be distributed
in several banks and financial institutes. Pooling data from multiple sources for learning can
usually achieve better prediction performance. Consequently, the traditional paradigm of
learning from a single dataset has been shifting towards distributed learning, i.e., data from
multiple parties are used to collaboratively train a learning model. In a conventional collab-
orative learning approach, there exists a central server, i.e., a cloud server and let multiple
data owners directly upload their data to the cloud server for training [3, 4].
Although federated learning achieves better performance than single dataset based
learning, there are some concerns on the data privacy. It is likely that during the training
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process, the private information of each party, e.g. health data records, can be disclosed,
which will breach users’ privacy. Hitaj et al. [5] proposed a GAN-based reconstruction attack
against the federated learning by assuming a malicious client, which utilized the shared model
as the discriminator to train a GAN framework. Hence, it becomes increasingly critical to
design a protocol to train a learning model from the distributed datasets, while guarantee
their privacy.
In addition, most federated learning frameworks require massive training data from
clients. Clients are usually distributed and may perform their unique activities associated
with their own environment, which leads to local dataset generated with different sizes
and distributions. In other words, clients generally holds non-IID dataset. Moreover, mo-
bile clients usually have limited resources and could not participate in time-consuming and
communication-extensive training process. Thus, efficiency aspect of federated learning also
needs to be addressed.
In this chapter, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving federated learning algo-
rithm. Specifically, each client trains on his local dataset and select the gradients that are
aligned with global model gradient tendency, as some local updates may not contribute to
the model convergence due to non-IID data among clients. Gradient magnitude is also con-
sidered as another selection criteria as large magnitude usually means more impact to model
training. By excluding these less consistent gradient uploads, the communication overhead
could be reduced significantly. In addition, clients will first add noise to perturb the gradi-
ents uploading to cloud server. Then, homomorphic encryption is adopted to encrypt the
noisy gradients before uploading to cloud server. Finally, the cloud server decrypts the sum
of the noisy gradients and updates the global model parameters without learning anything
else.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
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• We propose an efficient privacy-preserving federated learning framework, which care-
fully selects aligned and large magnitude gradients for uploading and in this way sig-
nificantly accelerates convergence and reduces the communication overhead during
training.
• We propose a privacy-preserving gradient uploading scheme that combines distributed
and collective noise adding and efficient homomorphic encryption to achieve differential
privacy without incurring too much noise. In particular, each client’s data is protected
by adding a small amount of noise to selected gradients before uploading. Noisy gradi-
ents are then encrypted so that the cloud server will only get the noisy sum of gradients.
The noisy sum contains minimal but enough noise to achieve ε−differential privacy.
Our scheme does not rely on the cloud server or a third party to add noise; the clients
collaboratively generate noise for differential privacy.
• Extensive experimental results show that the proposed scheme can achieve high accu-
racy while dramatically reduces communication overhead with strong privacy guaran-
tee.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents preliminaries
for distributed SGD and differential privacy. Section 4.3 introduces proposed framework.
Performance evaluation is presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 reviews related work. Section
4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Distributed SGD
Deep learning has been widely adopted to extract useful knowledge in image recog-
nition, text mining, and audio inferences areas. Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [6] is
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proposed and proven to be an efficient way to train deep learning frameworks. In particular,
with a mini-batch of client data, the model first computes the objective loss function L(θ)
based on the difference of predicted label y′ and ground truth label y. Then, the loss func-
tion would be minimized by updating the weights of model through −∂L/∂θ direction. The
training process iterates until convergence.
Distributed SGD [7] has been proposed to minimize the objective loss function L(θ)
in distributed ways. Applying classic mini-batch SGD, we perform updates to the model
parameters θ in the following way. Let αn ∈ Dn be a mini-batch dataset of client n, then at
each iteration k, distributed SGD can be performed as follows:











i ) based on
the mini-batch αn, and the cloud server averages these gradients from all the clients and
updates the global model parameters with learning rate η.
4.3 System Framework
In this section, we will introduce the system architecture, efficient gradient upload
and differentially-private uploading scheme under the federated learning framework.
4.3.1 System Overview
The federated learning framework for deep learning with edge computing is depicted
in Fig. 4.1. The system consists of two different entities: client node and cloud server. Client
nodes include different kinds of devices, such as smartphones, laptop, and wearable devices.
Specifically, each client node holds his own private dataset D, and is willing to col-
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Figure 4.1: Federated learning framework
laboratively train a deep learning model without revealing his own data. Generally mobile
clients are resource-limited. Thus, the local gradients are selected based on the efficient
gradient upload scheme. Moreover, local gradients are perturbed with differentially-private
noise and encrypted before uploading to prevent the cloud server from learning additional
information (e.g. each client’s data). The noisy sum aggregated by the cloud server will not
change much whether a client participates or not.
Despite the federated learning system benefits significantly from edge computing,
there are mainly two challenges existing in the system: a) during training process, how to
reduce communication overhead while ensure high model utility; b) how to securely aggregate
each client’s gradients with leaking his data privacy. To address those challenges, we propose
an efficient gradient selection scheme and privacy-preserving parameter updating mechanism
respectively.
4.3.2 Threat Model
We assume an honest-but-curious cloud server. Namely, the cloud server will correctly
execute operations according to the algorithm, but is curious to learn any information from
the clients. Additionally, some clients may be compromised during training to collude and
steal sensitive information from honest clients. It is assumed that the system has an estimate
over the upper bound of β for the fraction of compromised clients.
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A trusted key dealer is also assumed to securely issue keys to the clients and the cloud
server. Note that this assumption can be easily relaxed to an honest-but-curious key dealer
not colluding with the cloud server.
4.3.3 Local Gradient Selection
Motivation
In federated learning domain, the learning model is obtained by pooling massive
distributed local models. Since local models are trained using the client-specific data, to
some extent, there exists difference between the local and global models. As we mentioned
the non-IID property of local data, some local updates may not contribute to the training
process. For example, when training a computer vision framework on mobile, clients usually
have different local datasets associated with his own environment and usage pattern. Some
local updates could be tangential to the collaborative trend of the training convergence.
Thus, uploading these local gradients to the cloud server makes little contributions and may
also slow down the convergence of the training process.
Communication-efficient Upload
Since some local updates may not contribute to the convergence of training process,
we need to find a way to identify and filter out these local updates. The intuition here is
to compare the local updates with global trend. Specifically, the global gradient direction
indicates the current global convergence trend, if the local updates could not align well with
the global direction, then there is no need to upload the current local updates to the cloud
server.
Gradient magnitude has been used to estimate the relevance of the local updates in
many work ([9], [10]). However, even though magnitude could be an good estimate of local
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updates, it may still not identify and filter out those helpless local gradients. Specifically,
some local updates may contain gradients with large norm magnitude, but their gradient
direction may not be consistent with global model trend, therefore contributes little to global
convergence. To the contrary, some local updates with small norm magnitude could have
significant impact to global convergence if their gradient direction aligns well with global
trend.
Algorithm 4 Communication-efficient federated learning
Input: Database D1, D2, · · · , DN , mini-batch size B, alignment threshold ωλ, magnitude
threshold ωm, learning rate η, number of gradients M , bound C, privacy budget ε1
Output: θT
1: Initialize global parameters and global gradient g0
2: for each iteration t = 1, · · · , T do
3: for all client i = 1, 2, · · · , N in parallel do
4: Client i downloads current global model parameters θt




) ≥ ωtλ + Lap(2Mε1 ) or |g
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according to Eq. 4.3 and 4.4 then
7: Client i uploads gti to cloud server
8: Cloud server adds gti to set κ
9: end if
10: end for




12: θt+1 = θt − ηgt
13: end for
14: return θT
To this end, we propose an efficient communication upload scheme which considers
not only the magnitude, but also the local gradient direction alignment with the current
global convergence trend. Specifically, in each learning iteration, clients compare their local
updates with the global update so as to determine if their updates are aligned with global
update. The challenge here is that the global update cannot be known before the cloud
aggregation happens. One way to address this is to use the global gradients from previous
iteration to estimate the current global gradients, because there usually exists only slightly
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change between two consecutive updates.
Next, we propose an efficient way to measure the alignment of local update and
global update. In particular, we compare the sign of the local gradients and global gradients
element-wise, as same sign of gradients indicates similar tendency of updates. For each

















where gti and g
t mean the local gradient for client i and global gradient at iteration t,
respectively. M is the length of the gradients.
If the value of alignment metric in Eq. 4.3 for local update and global update is less
than a pre-defined threshold ωtλ, where t is the iteration index, the local update will not be
uploaded to the cloud server since it’s not consistent with the tendency of global convergence.
In this way, we can significantly reduce the communication overhead in the training process.
In addition, for gradient magnitude, we also select the local gradients which are
greater than a pre-defined threshold to upload, as large magnitude would have significant
contribution to global convergence. The whole selection process of each client i at iteration
t is shown as follows:
Selectionti = {gti| λ(gti,gt) ≥ ωtλ or |gti| ≥ ωtm} (4.4)
Since how gradients are selected for sharing may also leak clients’ privacy, we adopt
sparse vector technique [11] to protect the threshold selecting process. The details of the
69
procedure is summarized in Algorithm 4.
4.3.4 Privacy-preserving Parameter Update
Since the model training process requires gradients sharing between clients and cloud
server, the cloud server might learn each client’s gradients during training process which
will breach clients’ privacy. To this end, we propose a privacy-preserving parameter update
scheme. In particular, clients will first perturb the gradients uploading to cloud server by
adding Laplacian noise. Then, the noisy gradients will be encrypted with homomorphic
encryption before uploading to cloud server. Finally, the cloud server decrypts the sum of
the noisy gradients and updates the global model parameters.
There are three privacy aspects being considered in our scheme. First, the cloud
server gets the noisy sum only but nothing else (e.g. each individual client’s data). Second,
an client will not infer anything without the cloud sever capability. The last privacy aspect
is that the noisy sum obtained by cloud server will not be affected much whether a specific
client participate in the training or not. We will describe the details of encryption method
and achieving differential privacy in the following sections.
Encryption method [12]
Setup: The key dealer first creates a set of Nq random secrets, i.e. T = {t1, · · · , tNq}.
Set T is randomly separated into N disjoint subsets T1, · · · , TN , where there are q secrets in
each subset. Then, a subset T̃ of s secrets is randomly sent to the cloud server. Next, T − T̃
is again divided into N disjoint subsets T ′1, · · · , T ′N . Each client i receives Ti and T ′i .




H(fj(t))) mod M , where M = 2
dlog2(NC)e and C is the maximum value of gradi-
ents. As suggested in [12, 13], inner function fj(t) could be implemented as the HMAC of
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t with j as the key to save operation time. Moreover, function H could be formulated in
a way that truncates the output of fj(t) into shorter bits with length of log2M and uses
exclusive-OR to compensate the bits of the intermediate output. Each client finally encrypts
his own gradients by computing gi = (gi + ki) mod M .
Decryption: At each round t, the cloud sever generates key k0 = (
∑
j∈T̃ H(fj(t)))
mod M , which is used to decrypt the sum S by computing S = (
∑N
i=1 gi − k0) mod M .
Achieving differential privacy for update
Since the accurate sum S of gradients may leak clients’ privacy, we adopt differential
privacy to add noise to the gradients on the client side so that the cloud server would only
learn the noisy sum. Also the noisy sum will not change much whether a specific client
participates or not.
In particular, first each client clips the gradients to have bounded sensitivity ∆. The





where C is the desired gradient bound.
Next, noise ri is added to each client’s gradients such that
gi = Clip(gi) + ri (4.6)
Here, if the noise ri is too large (e.g. making each clients’ gradients differentially
private), the cloud server would collect massive noise in the gradient summation, which
degrades the performance of trained model. If the noise ri is too small, the summation of
gradients may not be fully protected against privacy leakage. Hence, considering β fraction
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where ε is the privacy budget, and p is the total number of clients at each iteration. In this
way, clients would collectively contribute enough noise to achieve differential privacy in the
summation of gradients on the cloud server side.
By following [14], privacy bugdet under Laplace mechanism can be estimated by
adopting moments accountant mechanism. In particular, for laplace mechanism with x ∈
Lap(∆f
ε
), privacy loss function L(x) can be formulated as follows:
L(x) =






Let ∆f = C, the λ-th moment function αL(λ), which denotes the log of the moment








According to Tail bound theorem in [14], the whole algorithm achieves (ε, δ)−differential




Thus, the moments accountant mechanism would output the accumulated privacy
cost when the training process terminates.
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Algorithm 5 Communication-efficient differentially-private federated learning
Input: Database D1, D2, · · · , DN , total iterations T , mini-batch size B, privacy budget
ε1, ε2, learning rate η, number of gradients M , bound C
Output: θT
1: Initialize global parameters and gradients g0
2: for each iteration t = 1, 2, · · · , T do
3: for all client i = 1, 2, · · · , N in parallel do
4: Client i receives current global model parameters
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according to Eq. 4.3 and 4.4 then
7: Client i sends notification to cloud server
8: end if
9: end for
10: The cloud server waits for notifications from all clients and randomly selects p clients
at iteration t
11: if p clients are selected then
12: The key dealer runs the setup process to assign secrets to the server and the p clients
13: for all client i = 1, 2, · · · , p in parallel do
14: Clip gradients gti = min(1,
C
||gti||
)gti according to Eq. 4.5




(1−β)p based on Eq. 4.7
16: Encrypt the noisy gradients and upload to cloud server according to section 4.3.4
17: end for
18: The cloud server decrypts the noisy sum with its key k0







20: else if less than p clients are received at iteration t then
21: The cloud server performs no global updates and continues to iteration t+ 1. Each
client updates his parameters locally for iteration t
22: end if
23: end for
24: return θT and accumulated privacy cost (ε, δ)
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To summarize, after the initialization step, all clients whose gradients align well with
global gradient or have large norm magnitude would send cloud server a notification. The
cloud server waits for notifications from all clients and randomly selects a subset of clients at
each iteration to upload their gradients through gradient clipping and encryption uploading
steps. Then the cloud server would decrypt the noisy sum with its key and update the
global parameters. If there are less than expected clients at the iteration, the global gradient
updating process would abort and proceed to next iteration. All the clients would update
their parameters locally at this iteration. The entire communication efficient differential
privacy algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 5.
LEMMA 1. Let’s set global sensitivity ∆ = 2C, Algorithm 5 achieves ε2−differential
privacy for cloud aggregation.
Proof 1. Let two datasets D and D′ be neighboring datasets. Without loss of generality,
assume D and D′ differ in the last tuple xn(x
′






























































This concludes the proof.
4.4 Performance Evaluation
4.4.1 Benchmark Frameworks
In this section, the effectiveness of proposed algorithm will be evaluated. We imple-
ment the following four SGD-based frameworks for comparison.
1) Vanilla FL[15]: This is the conventional, no-privacy framework.
2) DSSGD [9]: Under this scheme, differential privacy noise is added into selected
gradients. The parameters (e.g. batch size, learning rate) of DSSGD are tuned to its best
performance and the hyperparameters are set as follows: gradient upload ratio θu = 0.5,
gradient download ratio θd = 1, gradient selection threshold τ = 0.0001, and gradient bound
γ = 0.001.
3) EPFL[16]: Under this scheme, differential privacy noise is added into gradients.
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Then additively homomorphic encryption is adopted to encrypt noisy gradients before up-
loading to cloud server.
4) Standalone framework: In this framework, clients individually train local models
using standard SGD without any collaboration, which are susceptible to being trapped at
local optima.
4.4.2 Dataset and Experimental Setup
We experiment on two benchmark datasets: MNIST [17] and SVHN [18]. There are
70,000 data records in the MNIST dataset, out of which 60,000 records are training records
and the remaining are testing records. The size of each record is 32× 32, and it is grey-level
image with digits centered and ranging from 0 to 9. SVHN is another well-known dataset
which shows house numbers in different street views. There are 600,000 32×32 color images
in SVHN dataset. We use 100,000 as training examples and 10,000 as testing examples.
We use the accuracy of classification to evaluate the performance of different frame-
works. All the samples are sorted by their digit labels and then each client receives same
amount of examples (3,000 examples for MNIST, and 5,000 examples for SVHN), which
simulates a non-IID data distribution.
In this experiment, one of the most popular neural network architectures is imple-
mented, convolutional neural network (CNN). CNN framework is built with two convolu-
tional layers, which is followed by a Sigmoid layer and a max pooling layer for each convo-
lutional layer.
The architecture is implemented using Pytorch [19] framework. We set the learning
rate as 0.01 and the mini-batch size as 16. For weights initialization, we draw random value
from normal distribution with 0 mean and 1 standard deviation.
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(c) 90 client nodes
Figure 4.2: Model accuracy for different frameworks (MNIST)
we set clipping bound C = 0.5, and δ = 10−5. ε1 = ε2 = 1/2ε. The accumulated privacy
budget ε for each setting is computed using the privacy moments accounting method [14].
The experiments were set up with different clients to simulate federated learning setting.
The initial alignment threshold ωλ is set as 0.5. The initial value of ωm is set as 10%. Below,
we evaluate the performance of our framework in different settings.
4.4.3 Communication Overhead
In this section, communication overhead is measured among different frameworks.
Here we set an intermediate value of ε = 10 and upper bound for δ as 10−5. As we can
see from Fig. 4.2 and 4.3, generally our scheme outperforms DSSGD, EPFL and standalone























200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400






















200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400






















200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
(c) 90 client nodes
Figure 4.3: Model accuracy for different frameworks (SVHN)
performance of our scheme needs much less training iterations than DSSGD, EPFL and
Vanilla FL. For example, under 30 client nodes scenario with MNIST dataset, when train-
ing accuracy reaches 80%, our scheme needs only 180 iterations under 30 clients setting,
while DSSGD needs 44% more iterations, Vanilla FL needs 66% more iterations and EPFL
needs 133% more iterations, which shows the effectiveness of uploading aligned gradients
in our scheme. For SVHN dataset, the comparison results are also similar to performance
with MNIST dataset. As the total number of clients increases, generally we achieve better
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(c) 90 client nodes
Figure 4.4: Accuracy of different frameworks with varying privacy budget (MNIST)
4.4.4 Privacy Budget
In this experiment, we will evaluate the tradeoff between model accuracy and privacy
budget ε. Specifically, the alignment threshold ωλ = 0.8, ωm = 0.1. We vary the privacy
budget from 0.1, · · · , 100 with δ as 10−5.
As we can see from Fig. 4.4 and 4.5, our proposed scheme could achieve comparable
accuracy with vanilla FL framework with modest privacy budget. For example, when ε =
5, 10, N = 30 in MNIST dataset, our scheme achieves 92.5% and 93.5% accuracy respectively,
which is comparable to that of vanilla FL (i.e. 94%). Moreover, our scheme outperforms
EPFL, DSSGD and standalone frameworks with different privacy budget. This is mainly due
to much less noise is added on the client side during training, hence the model performance
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(c) 90 client nodes
Figure 4.5: Accuracy of different frameworks with varying privacy budget (SVHN)
model accuracy can be improved even with stronger privacy guarantee (e.g. ε = 0.1, 1).
4.4.5 Scalability
In this section, we evaluate the scalability of the proposed algorithm with different
number of clients, which is illustrated in Fig. 4.6. A small ε = 0.5 is adopted, δ = 10−5, and
the number of clients ranges from 30 to 150. As shown in the Fig. 4.6, the model accuracy
improves with more clients participating in federated learning, which is due to the increasing
availability of training data.
In summary, our proposed scheme achieves the best tradeoff between communication
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Figure 4.6: Federated learning with different clients (ε = 0.5, δ = 10−5)
4.5 Related Work
This section provides the background of efficient federated learning algorithms, as
well as privacy-preserving federated learning approaches.
4.5.1 Efficient Federated Learning
Most efficient distributed deep learning works can be classified into two categories.
The first category is quantization, which reduces the precision of parameters. Vanhoucke
et al. [20] proposed to leverage fixed-point instructions to facilitate the training of neural
networks. Hubara et al. [21] demonstrated to significantly reduce run-time communication
overhead during training with short bit weights and activations. Shen et al. [22] also pro-
posed to use second order Hessian information for quantizing BERT models to ultra low
precision. Suresh et al. [23] applied a structured random rotation before quantization to fur-
ther reduce the less error of training objectives. Sun et al. [24] proposed Lazily Aggregated
Quantized gradient (LAQ) to reduce transmitted bits as well as communication rounds.
The other category is sparsification. Strom et al. [25] proposed to select important
gradients based on a constant threshold, and only uploads ones greater than the threshold.
Mills et al. [26] proposed to leverage a distributed form of Adam optimisation for reducing
communcaitoon overhead. Teerapittayanon et al. [27] proposed to generate precise feature
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extraction by dissecting DNN frameworks into two parts and improve performance in the
cloud. However, end users are involved in the iterative training phase, where training passes
gradients through devices, resulting in high communication overhead. Ivkin et al. [28]
demonstrated to communicate gradient sketches during training to reduce communication
cost. Nikoli et al. [29] proposed to choose the gradients based on threshold and then encode
it with lower-bits. Shi et al. [30] developed an optimal merged gradient sparsification
algorithm, which merges gradients in different layers to further accelerate the training. Chai
et al. [31] presented asynchronous training tiers with each client holding Non-i.i.d. dataset,
which supports synchronous and asynchronous tiers training to accelerate model training.
Our work belongs to the line of sparsification, but selecting gradients based on align-
ment with global gradient and gradient magnitude has received little attention.
4.5.2 Privacy-preserving Federated Learning
Existing works on privacy-preserving distributed learning mostly utilize either differ-
ential privacy mechanism, secure multiparty computation or homomorphic encryption. For
differential privacy, Pathak et al. [4] introduced a DP-based global classifier by aggregating
the locally trained classifiers. Sun et al. [32] proposed to apply Noise-Free Differential Pri-
vacy (NFDP) mechanism into a federated learning framework. Chen et al. [33] perturbed
local embedding to ensure the differential privacy of local information. Choudhury et al.
[34] studied applying differential privacy to protect sensitive healthcare data. Triastcyn and
Faltings [35] improved the process of recording privacy budgets in distributed learning at
different training stages by adopting Bayesian privacy accounting method. Zhao et al. [36]
proposed to efficiently improve performance of crowdsourcing applications under federated
learning based on local differential privacy (LDP).
Similarly, secure multiparty computation aims to jointly compute a function over dis-
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tributed participants data while ensuring data privacy. Xu et al. [37] proposed to employ
an SMC protocol based on functional encryption to account for participants dropping out
during training. Bonawitz et al. [38] adopted using secret sharing that enables authenti-
cated encryption. Byrd and Polychroniadou [39] constructed a federated learning system by
applying differential privacy on top of MPC to learn on financial institute datasets.
A number of works have been proposed to adopt homomorphic encryption for fed-
erated learning tasks. Xu et al. [40] proposed to protect users’ data privacy (i.e. local
gradients) with double-masking scheme during distributed learning process. The users can
also verify the aggregated results from cloud server by testing the Proof. Liu et al. [41]
built an homomorphic encryption based framework to train federated transfer learning set-
ting. Hardy et al. [42] adopted additively homomorphic scheme to train federated logistic
regression model. Liu et al. [43] proposed utilizing partial homomorphic encryption method
to encrypt model parameters for optimizing training convergence process. Zhang et al. [44]
proposed to adopt a large integer for encoding and concatenating gradient batches. Then
the integer would be encrypted for transmission. They also presented to efficiently perform
element-wise aggregation in the encoded gradient batches by applying advanced quantization
schemes. Gradient clipping protocol was also proposed to help bound the gradient range.
However, efficient federated learning with both homomorphic encryption and differential
privacy has not been studied well.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated efficient federated learning with differential
privacy. In particular, each client uploads his gradients based on the efficient gradient
upload scheme. Then, the selected gradients would be perturbed and encrypted before
transmitting to cloud server for averaging. The cloud server would learn the noisy sum but
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nothing else during the training process. In addition, the noisy sum would not change much
whether a specific client participates or not. Extensive experimental results show that the
proposed framework can achieve high training accuracy with strong privacy guarantee while
significantly reduce communication cost and scales well.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we proposed a set of systems to protect users’ privacy in cloud-
assisted data analytics.
In Chapter 2, we proposed a secure, efficient, and verifiable outsourcing protocol for
geometric programming, which has wide applications in data analysis. In particular, a secure
and efficient transformation scheme is employed to protect the data privacy. We apply the
gradient projection method to solve the encrypted geometric programming problem in the
cloud side. Experiments were conducted on both Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)
and a laptop to evaluate performance of the designed outsourcing protocol, and the results
showed the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed algorithm.
In Chapter 3, we designed a differentially private framework to train logistic regres-
sion models out of distributed data sources (e.g., individual users and organizations). To
achieve high learning accuracy while maintaining privacy, our solution considers the relevance
between input data features and the model output when generating noises. In particular,
at each data owner, more noise is added to the coefficients of the objective polynomial
form that are less relevant to the local model output, and less noise to those that are more
relevant. When the local parameters are uploaded to a cloud server for aggregation, the
server uses an evaluation dataset to assess the data quality of clients, and then selects the
model parameters of a subset of clients into aggregation based on the data quality of clients
while protecting clients privacy. Extensive experimental results showed that the proposed
framework can achieve high classification accuracy while protecting privacy and being robust
against low-quality data.
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In Chapter 4, we proposed an efficient privacy-preserving federated learning system
that enables multiple clients to collaboratively train their neural network models without re-
vealing their own dataset. In particular, each user selectively chooses the gradients to upload
based on the tendency of the global model convergence and gradient magnitude. Moreover,
clients first perturb the gradients uploading to cloud server by adding Laplacian noise. Then,
the noisy gradients are encrypted with homomorphic encryption before uploading to cloud
server. Finally, the cloud server decrypts the sum of the noisy gradients and updates the
global model parameters during the training process. Extensive experiments on benchmark
dataset show that the efficient privacy-preserving deep learning scheme significantly reduces
communication overhead, achieves minimal accuracy loss with strong data privacy and scales
well.
5.2 Future Work
This dissertation proposed several systems to provide privacy protection for cloud-
assisted data analytics. Besides collecting more datasets to better validate the proposed
systems, there are still many other issues that deserve further exploration. In the following,
we discuss two future research directions.
• Privacy-Preserving Cloud-Assisted Data Analytics with Fair Exchange: Al-
though we proposed a secure and efficient outsourcing scheme for large-scale geometric
programming, we have not addressed the fair exchange issue in the system. In partic-
ular, if the cloud server performs computation tasks before user paying the service fee,
the user might not pay after receiving the results. If the user pays the service fee first,
the cloud server might not execute the computation and return random and invalid
results. Some work have been done to address the fair exchange issue [1, 2, 3, 4], but
their schemes have not been adopted in secure outsourcing of large scale mathematical
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optimizations. Therefore, it is necessary to design a privacy-preserving outsourcing
system with fair exchange.
• Privacy-Preserving Distributed Learning with Heterogeneous Architectures:
Even though we have designed privacy-preserving distributed logistic regression and
efficient federated learning systems to protect user privacy during training, the current
design can only learn the same model across all the users. Since different users may
need different learning models, it would be interesting to study how to extend federated
learning to collaboratively train models with heterogeneous architectures.
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